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Summary. This essay focuses on the turn to ethics within biosemiotics and rearticula-
tes the difference between semiosis and semiotics in order to orient biosemiotic ethics 
to the fundamental importance of human responsibility in and to the semiosphere.  
Zusammenfassung. Dieser Essay behandelt die Wende zur Ethik innerhalb der Biose-
miotik. Der Unterschied zwischen Semiose und Semiotik wird reformuliert, um die Biose-
miotik an die fundamentale Bedeutung menschlicher Verantwortung innerhalb und gegen-
über der Semiosphäre anzuschließen.
1.   Setting the Frame: from “Unethical” to Ethics
The “turn to ethics”, the development of a focus on ethics within semiotics, 
is quite a recent development. It took place under the moniker “existential 
ethics” with Eero Tarasti (2000); Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio introdu-
ced it under the label “semioethics”;1 and now we have talk about “biose-
miotic ethics” (Tønnessen 2014a; see also Beever and Tønnessen 2013). 
What exactly does all this come down to?
Let me start backwards. What does “unethical” mean? I’ve given a lot of 
thought to this topic, but in a so to speak private context. For as I have wat-
ched this 21st century “turn to ethics” in semiotics develop, I have seen that 
emphasizing empathy in animals, or their care for their young, or whether 
an organism can feel pain – all this and more has its importance and inte-
rest yet misses the seminal point that ethics must be an outgrowth of res-
ponsibility, and responsibility applies only to a being capable (whether it 
actually does so or not) of looking beyond its own boundaries as a biologi-
cal individual or type to reckon with the larger picture of the biosphere sus-
tained within a framework of relations that perception alone cannot reveal.
So what does unethical, not “ethical”, mean? I propose that “unethical” 
means “failure to live up to a responsibility”. So, then, the fundamental ques-
tion of what ethical means depends upon the understanding of responsibi-
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lity. Some years ago I saw a cartoon in The New Yorker magazine picturing 
two gentlemen in a tree, one a little higher than the other, with a couple of 
tigers trying to get them from below. And one gentleman says to the other: 
“Will you please explain to these animals how much we have done for them?” 
– the hope being that, once that has been explained, the hostile tigers will 
feel some gratitude and perhaps even some obligation not to harm the two 
foresters. If only they could be made to appreciate the work of the two men 
they would refrain from threatening their lives. Of course, there is the pro-
blem that, as Sebeok so effectively and in so many ways demonstrated, 
one cannot communicate linguistically with any other than human animals. 
Sebeok had revised Lotman’s idea of primary modeling system to show 
that verbal language is but an exaptation from the human Innenwelt as spe-
cies-specifically distinct from the generically alloanimal Innenwelt in being 
biologically undetermined in its conceptual interpretation of sensible objects, 
enabling it to deal directly with relations in their difference from related things 
as uninstantiable to perception. What Lotman characterized as “primary” in 
this regard, namely, the role of linguistic communication – a matter of Umwelt 
rather than Innenwelt – is actually, and perforce, secondary, not primary. 
On the other hand, culture as Lotman’s “secondary” modeling system is 
actually tertiary. 
2.    Physical Environment in General and Environmental Niche in  
Particular
So let us start out from a point that we can all agree upon: that there is a 
physical environment which is in some sense the same no matter what is 
in that environment, whether it is a rock, a butterfly, a tree, a human being: 
the earth goes around the sun, and it doesn’t matter what the Bible says 
on this point or what the Koran says or what the ancient and medieval phi-
losophers believed. That’s the physical environment. Then there is a rather 
common notion of the “environmental niche”, completely part of the lar-
ger physical environment or “cosmos”, but crucially that part of the larger 
whole upon which some given organism or even inorganic substance 
depends or requires in particular to continue in existence. For this entire 
universe – niche plus cosmos as a whole – consists of finite beings which 
are in constant interaction with their surroundings. And that interaction 
determines whether, how, and to what extent the individual substance, 
organic or inorganic, will continue to exist. A stone that would last a mil-
lion or more years on earth wouldn’t last a second on the sun. Every sin-
gle thing that exists in the universe depends on an environment in this 
niche sense.
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2.1  Anticipating Lebenswelt:2 a Species-Specifically Human Concept  
Formed from within the Umwelt
But take note that this notion of “physical universe” is a species-specifically 
human concept. No other animal has this concept. And you have to consi-
der the difference between the physical environment, which simply is what 
it is, and the physical environment as it exists within the awareness of some 
animal organism. For this is where we come to the concept of Umwelt. What 
part of the physical environment do we become aware of? That absolutely 
depends upon what type of body the animal has. Even a perceived color 
scheme depends not only on the “colored things” but as well on the sub-
jective constitution of the visual organ interacting with the environment: the 
“colors seen” result from the subjective constitution on both sides of the 
interaction, not simply on one side or the other. The “specific color” exists 
only in the relation of awareness arising from the agere et pati of the ani-
mal body with its surrounding bodies. The same is true for the perception 
of all objects insofar as that perception is rooted in sensation first of all (with 
conceptual interpretation often temporally simultaneous but always logi-
cally posterior).
2.2  Why Umwelt Formation Is Necessary in the First Place
So it is the kind of body you or any animal has that determines what you 
are aware of in the physical environment and we know that, from the stand-
point of the physical environment as a whole, the awareness is extremely 
limited, extremely partial. Now especially if you are an animal that has to 
wander around to get what it needs, being aware however partially of the 
physical surroundings is not enough. You have to interpret what you become 
aware of precisely in terms of what is good for you (+), what bad for you (-), 
and what safe to ignore (∅). (Plants organize their surroundings as well but 
without the psychological dimension; whence for them ∅ is really “zero”, not 
“safe to ignore” but simply “nothing”. The animal is aware of the ∅ but jud-
ges it – rightly or wrongly! – not to be a threat, not something that needs 
concern.) And for the animal the (+) / (-) / (∅) categories are not simply fixed 
but depend more or less (again depending upon the type of the animal’s 
body) upon estimation and perceptual judgment. The categories can change, 
and the animal may misclassify – to its peril. In any event, that “realm of 
awareness” or “objective world”, in contrast with an environmental niche as 
simply reducible to components of the physical universe, is the Umwelt, the 
“meaningful world” as species-specific to animals according to their bodily 
type. The Umwelt is the physical environment insofar as the animal beco-
mes aware of it in combination or entanglement with the interpretation that 
the animal introduces into that awareness to guide its interactive behavior 
with the world.
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3.    On the Difference between Umwelt Objects and Environmental Things
So pay attention to this decisive fact. The animal introduces concepts pre-
cisely in order to interpret according to its needs the physical surroundings 
as sensed. Concepts as cognitive psychological states are always accom-
panied by cathectic states, and these two differ from physiological states 
in that the physiological states give rise to relations only contingently and 
as long as the subjectivities of interaction both continue in existence (sup-
rasubjectivity realized only intersubjectively), while the cognitive and cathectic 
psychological states provenate3 relations always necessarily; and so, even 
when the cognitive interpretation is mistaken or deluded, an objective ter-
minus is presented to the animal within but suprasubjective respecting its 
awareness. That’s what objects are: the terms of cognitive and cathectic 
states (psychological states) as suprasubjectively attained via the relations 
psychological states necessarily provenate. Thus objects begin in the world 
of things resultant upon the interactions between the animal body’s organs 
of sense and surrounding bodies acting thereon, but through the formati-
on by internal sense (and then also intellect, in the case of human animals) 
of conceptual interpretations (see Deely 1971) this nascent objectivity beco-
mes part of a larger objective world which does not and cannot be redu-
ced simply to the physical things of the environment which it – the generi-
cally animal Umwelt – includes but transcends.
Thus an animal with food present to its awareness objectively goes loo-
king for that food in its subjective dimension which does not reduce to but 
is recognizable within the animal’s objective world or Umwelt. The animal 
knows what it’s looking for! Reducing objects to ideas (an inevitable conse-
quent, by the way, of Ockham’s doctrine on relations) was the real mistake 
of Descartes, fatal for any semiotic understanding. Everybody, every animal 
body at least, has its own ideas, more or less “in your head”. But the objects 
of those ideas are not in your head; the ideas as part of your subjectivity are 
but the fundaments provenating relations which terminate suprasubjectively 
at objects which are not “in your head” but are always “other” than you even 
when the objects don’t have a subjective dimension of their own as “things”.
3.1 What Intersubjectivity Presupposes
The usual terminology for relations as “intersubjective” only applies when the 
termini of the relations, the “others” for your awareness, do have the subjec-
tivity of existing also as a thing. The proof that that terminology for relations 
– “intersubjective” – is insufficient is the realization that what is true of all rela-
tions is that they are suprasubjective, while only sometimes are they also 
intersubjective. Everyone, or nearly everyone, reading this knows that Othel-
lo was a general in the Venetian army with a wife named Desdemona and 
Napoleon Emperor of France with a wife named Josephine; but only the rela-
tion between Napoleon and Josephine was ever intersubjective as well as 
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objective, while the relation between Othello and Desdemona never was and 
never could be intersubjective because neither Othello nor Desdemona ever 
had existence as subjects physically interacting. There was a time when you 
could shake hands with Napoleon. There never was a time when you could 
shake hands with Othello. Napoleon and Othello have in common that they 
are both objects, and as such “other than ourselves”. They differ in that Napo-
leon was once a subject of existence, while Othello never was.4
3.2  Further on the Thing-Object Distinction
Realizing the difference between a thing and an object is crucial, for a thing 
exists whether or not it is known, whereas an object (as such) exists only 
when and to the extent that it is known, i.e. only as terminating a relation 
to some finite mind. As a result, when the things that the animal becomes 
aware of enter into objectivity via sensation and are conceptualized in per-
ception, the conceptualization raises the objects to a level beyond the world 
of things, a level which no longer reduces to the physical surroundings as 
sensible, to being in principle a part of “the world of things”. The animal loo-
king for food is looking for an objective reality that is also a physical reali-
ty; but in so looking the animal is guided by an objective reality which, in 
contrast to physical things, is not – as object – “located” specifically here 
or there in the physical environment as things (as such) necessarily are.
So, you go looking for a pair of scissors. You go to the drawer where they 
are ‘supposed to be’ and they’re not there, at which point you express your-
self so obnoxiously that your wife, who has the scissors in another room, 
comes in and plants the scissors in your head (the “dream of Descartes” 
come true!). The scissors weren’t in your head, but in order to look for them 
you had to have the idea of scissors in the first place. So it is clear that the 
object is different from the idea, and once a concept has been introduced 
the object need not even be real in the sense of having a subjective dimen-
sion to its being independent of its objective being in awareness.
4.   The Bearing upon Ethics of “Recognizing Signs”
But what has all this got to do with ethics? Is it the case that there are other 
animals besides humans that recognize signs as signs. Before we can offer 
a judgment on this point we have to agree upon what a sign is. We have in 
fact three definitions or “meanings of ‘sign’” to contend with.
4.1  “Sign” in the Most Common Sense of the Term
First there is Augustine (354–430) who introduces the original general defi-
nition of “sign”5 as anything which, when it makes an impression on the sen-
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ses, also brings something other than itself into awareness. But to make 
an impression on sense the sign has to be a material thing, a physical rea-
lity in the environment. So here “sign” is first defined in terms of an ability 
to act upon sense, hence as a material object, something you can see and 
point to.
4.2  “Sign” in the Psychological Sense
Second there is the psychological sense of “sign”: after about eight centu-
ries (!) of thinking over Augustine’s definition, philosophers around the time 
of Roger Bacon (c.1214/20–1292) began to consider that ideas – cogniti-
ve states within animal subjectivity – don’t make an impression on the sen-
ses, but they do bring into awareness something other than themselves. 
Isn’t bringing an “other” into awareness more fundamental to being a sign 
than making an impression upon the senses? Aren’t ideas signs, even 
though they aren’t material objects in sensation? So a second idea of “sign” 
was introduced and developed (at least in the Scholastic circles of univer-
sity life over the next few centuries; but this second idea of “sign” never 
seems, so to speak, to have crossed the mind of either Descartes or Locke 
in their “turn to the subject” beginning the journey of modern philosophy 
down the Way of Ideas6). But note that signs in this second sense are not 
themselves objects of direct awareness: they are not the terminus but the 
fundament of the sign relations in which they are directly involved.
For example, consider how many people looking at a clock to see what 
time it is reflect upon or even advert to the fact that if they did not already 
have the idea of a clock in their head they could not see a clock in the first 
place, let alone have what they “see” – a circular object, say, with a white 
background and black markings – tell them the time of day? The example 
illustrates the point that ideas are not objects but interpretations that pre-
sent something sensed – some object “other” than the one sensing – as 
this or that. Animals other than human animals without doubt are aware of 
“signs” in Augustine’s original sense. Are they also aware of signs in this 
second sense of “sign”? Ideas can become objects, but only upon reflec-
tion. Can other animals than humans reflect upon their ideas, reflect upon 
the activity itself of consciousness in the first place and idea-formation? 
There is no doubt animals form ideas. There is no doubt that animals make 
use of signs in this second sense no less than in the first sense. But are 
they aware of signs in this second sense, semiosis as underlying and presup-
posed to the objective being of objects as perceived in the first place?7
4.3  “Sign” in the Semiotic Sense of their Constitutive Formal Being
Without dwelling upon an answer to this question about animal awareness 
of “signs” in the second sense as introduced by the later Latin scholastic 
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philosophers, let us take note of the third sense of “sign” that emerges after 
another four-and-a-half or so centuries passed since Bacon’s introduction 
of a second sense of “sign” following upon Augustine’s first general defini-
tion. By the time of John Poinsot (1589–1644), semiotic consciousness in 
the Latin line awakened to the realization that what makes signs to be “signs” 
– in either the first sense of material objects impressing sense, or the second 
sense of ideas as presenting material objects interpreted as this or that – 
is precisely the relation whereby one object is enabled to present another 
than itself to the animal aware of both.
4.3.1 Sign Vehicles (or ‘Representamens’) in contrast with Signs as   
      Triadic Relations
The so-called “signs” in the first two senses alike are in reality but the vehic-
les (Peirce sometimes calls them “representamens”) or, so to speak, the 
bodies of the being proper to signs;8 but the being that makes these sign-
vehicles – “signs” in the ordinary or in the psychological sense – actually 
be “signs” at all is the relation that suprasubjectively unites the three terms 
as one instance of signification. And this relation, irreducibly triadic, as a 
relation, shares in common with dyadic physical relations the distinctive 
feature of being invisible to sense and indifferent to distance and location 
regarding its terminus (though location especially is anything but a matter 
of indifference for the animal seeking a physical instantiation of its object 
of desire!).
4.3.2 Animals Generically Semiosic in contrast with Animals Specifically  
 Semiotic
It is certainly true that “there are other animals besides humans that reco-
gnize signs as signs” (Tønnessen 2009) as regards “signs” in the first sense 
as identified by Augustine, and the second sense of “signs” is certainly appli-
cable within alloanimal behavior (for all animals are semiosic). Nonethel-
ess, it is with regard to the third sense of sign that human animals stand 
apart as not only semiosic but also semiotic – i.e., able to deal with that 
dimension of objectivity which does not admit of direct instantiation to sense 
and hence remains invisible to sense-perception. Only intellectual concepts 
can deal with signs in the third sense. “Signs” in the first two senses are 
rather sign vehicles, “representamens”, and it is nothing in their proper being 
but only their foreground position of presenting an other than themselves 
to a third – that is, their position under a triadic relation – that makes them 
to be “signs” in the first place, even in the ordinary sense of the word. Yet, 
throughout it is not that object than can be seen and pointed to or that con-
cept formed in the mind that constitutes a sign formally; only the positio-
ning under a triadic relation provides the formal being of any sign – it is 
from relations as triadic that semiosis springs.
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The sign as a relation which suprasubjectively unites three terms creates 
an Umwelt when at least one of the terms united is a psychological state. 
Thus every animal lives in an Umwelt, in the sense of the term von Uexküll 
established. It is a pity, but a matter of fact, that von Uexküll was overly influ-
enced by Kant; because if the human mind works the way Kant proposed 
that it works, trying to communicate with one subjectively other is a waste 
of time, for each of us is locked inside the bubble of our private conscious-
ness– Leibniz’s idea that “monads have no windows” was precisely syste-
matized in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Nothing enters from outside and 
nothing exits from inside; it only seems that we communicate because our 
objective world is formed from the same a-priori patterns. Yet all this is but 
a consequence of the erroneous affirmation that relations have being only 
in awareness (see Deely 2013).
In contrast, Poinsot, a figure in time who could have shaken hands with 
Galileo and Descartes, pointed out that what is unique about relations – 
singular – is not at all that they are formed in awareness, but that what 
makes any given relation dependent upon or independent of awareness is 
simply the conditions or circumstances under which the relation obtains. 
One and the same relation, unchanged in its positive being as relation (i.e., 
in its existence as irreducibly suprasubjective), will be real under one set 
of circumstances and fictional under another set of circumstances.
We are supposed to meet for dinner; you show up and I don’t (or vice-
versa), and you are annoyed until you find out that I died on the way to the 
dinner. At my moment of death, at the moment I ceased to have a materi-
al subjectivity encounterable in space and time, the relation between us 
went from being intersubjective as well as suprasubjective to being only 
suprasubjective; yet under both sets of circumstances I (or you) as the 
objective terminus of the dinner engagement remained suprasubjective (if 
not intersubjective!) as a constant influencing the behavior of the one still 
living in whom the relation retained a subjective foundation as a cognitive 
state provenating the relation as suprasubjectively terminating at an “other”.
Thus it is because reality, especially for the animal, is not only physical 
but also objective, that the Umwelt never reduces to the “environmental 
niche” as discussed above. But in the human Umwelt we encounter Sebeok’s 
idea of the “primary modeling system” underlying the eventual establish-
ment of culture within an otherwise animal society. This is the unique, bio-
logically underdetermined manner in which the human Innenwelt models 
the objective world of animal awareness, by adding to the (+)/(-)/(∅) cate-
gories of animal objectification relating objects to our interests a relation of 
“self-identity” enabling the objects to appear further as “things in their own 
rights”, objects which regardless of their status in relation to our desires 
and interests “are what they are” independently of the (+)/(-)/(∅). It is the 
ability to form relations in their difference from objects related that distin-
guishes the human Innenwelt, and that capacity for dealing objectively with 
what is uninstantiable for sense perception enables us to exapt relations 
formed as networks sustaining the objective world (entangled with it) which 
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establish the invisible boundary lines between the social world of animal 
life and the cultural world of human animal society.
5.   Ethics Understood (or ‘Redefined’) in Semiotic Terms
Now the clearest statement regarding the matter of ethics as far as con-
cerns the semiotic tradition is the one given by Jeff Bernard. What is nee-
ded, he said, is “an ethics stringently derived from semiosis” (recorded in 
Deely 2010b: xv–xvi). If we understand by ethics the identification of res-
ponsibilities, then, much as we might find empathic the behavior of animals 
that are not human, we will find that an ethics which is not anthropocentric 
is not an ethics, because only human animals can become aware and take 
account of relations as such. In the past, ethics has been conceived almost 
exclusively in terms of the socio-cultural interactions of human beings. But 
only in the last hundred years or so, and thanks to the development of sci-
ence in the modern sense, have we come to realize that what we do has 
effects not only within our species but upon the whole living world. Respon-
sibility follows not upon “instinct” or animal estimation; responsibility follows 
only upon the knowledge of “the way things are” as well as the context which 
makes them so. Conceptual knowledge at the intellectual level alone gene-
rates responsibility. Alloanimals (non-human species) may care for their 
young, protect their mates and offspring, etc.; but they do not do any of this 
out of a sense of responsibility (cf. Cobley 2016: 72–74). Responsibility is 
an extension of speculative understanding, just as practical knowledge is 
an extension of speculative knowledge.
5.1  The Manner in which Semiotics Expands the Scope of Ethical Consi-
deration
Human animals not only are unique in having responsibilities, but also in 
the extent of those responsibilities: for we have learned through and on the 
basis of semiosis become “metasemiosis” or semiotics that our interactions 
involve us in the whole of Gaia, not just in the human socio-cultural sphe-
re. That is why Jeff Bernard considered the best name for ethics as we must 
come to understand it today is precisely as Susan Petrilli has proposed: 
semioethics.
Getting off into the question of whether a living being is sentient or not 
is interesting, but it can have ethical relevance only indirectly and in the 
context of human responsibility as a species-specific obligation to seek the 
good – an obligation incompatible with selfishness in contrast to self-fulfill-
ment, be it noted – as circumstances allow. After all, all animals including 
the humans share one thing in common: they require nourishment to sur-
vive and something other than themselves must perish in order for human 
bodily nourishment to be achieved. Whether it’s a carrot or a cow, something 
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has paid with its life to satisfy your appetite. Baldly put, you can’t eat a very 
broad range of food without killing, directly or indirectly;9 and whether what 
dies in order for you to have food to eat is an animal or plant is not what 
makes you more or less “ethical”: only the manner in which you acquire the 
needed nourishment falls directly under ethics. We are obliged to do what 
is “good”, and what is good depends on so many factors that a single defi-
nition for all circumstances is not even possible. So the question of ethics 
goes way beyond social interaction among animals, human or not, and 
including the subordination of alloanimals to the human good; the questi-
on of ethics concerns the human beings’ responsibility for the human good, 
the species-specifically human good, always centrally and first of all but not 
exclusively: for now, thanks to the development of science in the modern 
sense (ideoscopic science), we learn that this “human good” depends not 
only upon socio-cultural organization and interaction but also upon our rela-
tionship to the physical environment as a whole, including especially the 
biosphere (and Umwelten thereof) in totality. That’s the real development 
of ethics in semiotics; that’s the idea of “semioethics” (I’m not so sure that’s 
exactly Susan Petrilli’s idea of it, but that’s the real idea that follows from 
Jeff Bernard’s definition).
5.2  A Semiosic Ability Found Only in Human Animals
The question, then, of recognizing signs as signs in the third or full sense 
arrived at in Poinsot’s work and taken up after the Latins by Peirce10 depends 
upon the ability to deal with relations directly, an ability found only in human 
animals, and the ability which opens the way not only to culture within soci-
al organization but also to the recognition of the difference between res-
ponsibility, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, simple behavior gui-
ded by (+)/(-)/(∅) at the alloanimal level – the level of Umwelt generically 
considered in contrast to the Umwelt as species-specifically human which 
I call Lebenswelt.11 There’s a quotation I like to use from Jacques Maritain, 
to the effect that while all animals make use of signs, only human animals 
know that there are signs; only human animals thus are semiotic animals: 
“Animals make use of signs [in senses 1 and 2 above] without perceiving 
the relation of signification [sign in sense 3 above, sign explicitly recognized 
as the being from which semiosis follows]” (1957: 53).12
6.   Revealing the Ethical Import of the Recognition of Signs
The answer to Morten’s question about recognizing signs as signs, in its 
bearing upon ethics, depends upon the animal’s ability or inability to deal 
with relations in their own right as distinct from, even though dependent 
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upon, related objects and things. Because once you have realized that what 
makes a sign a sign is always a relation, and that no relation can be direct-
ly instantiated to perception, you have reached the point where human 
understanding goes beyond animal estimation. (I am confident that there 
are other animals besides earthly human animals capable of knowing signs 
in all three senses, and the third sense particularly; but these are extrater-
restrial animals from other planetary systems of stars other than our sun, 
not the earthly alloanimals).
By bringing this speculative realization to the fore, semiotics inevitably 
expands to consider the ethical dimension as one of (if not the principal 
one of) the “practical applications” to which perforce semiotic knowledge 
leads.13 Note that Deely (2010c) is dedicated to “The Semioticians of the 
22nd Century”, because that’s how long it is going to take the university 
world to figure out how to incorporate semiotics into its central curriculum. 
It took about 250 years to incorporate science in the modern sense into our 
universities; semiotics, the antidote to the specializations required for idio-
scopic science as the only inherently interdisciplinary perspective on human 
experience and knowledge, has much resistance from established acade-
mic habits to overcome – as does semioethics.
Animals have “rights” because of human responsibilities, not because 
they are sentient. Within semiotic understanding, plants have rights too, 
even if less conspicuously. Animals don’t have “rights” because of the kind 
of animal they are, or because they feel pain, etc. Alloanimals have rights 
precisely as part of and essential to the biosphere within which the human 
animal has responsibilities to see to it that good overall needs to be done. 
That is, the accomplishment of good as human flourishment –a “species-
specific” or “common” good, not the hedonism of individual human pursuit 
of pleasure. This latter effectively reduces anthroposemiosis to its zoöse-
miosic component by changing the relevance of what distinguishes human 
understanding to the determination of behavior. Doing this good lies within 
our power as animals exercising (not merely capable of exercising) respon-
sibility.
But human animals are the only animals that have responsibilities, and 
these responsibilities are a consequence of our being semiotic as well as 
semiosic animals; for animals that are only semiosic, even though cogni-
zant, remain incapable of dealing with perceptually uninstantiable objects, 
with the result of having no responsibilities. Rights are derivative from our 
responsibilities, the responsibilities attendant upon a metasemiosis as dis-
tinguishing the being of semiotic animals. You can teach a cat to use a lit-
ter box, but you cannot teach a cat not to be irresponsible. Of the many 
things you can teach a cat, responsibility is not among them. For the cat as 
for every alloanimal is necessarily semiosic but is not and cannot become 
semiotic. Metasemiosis, in short, while still semiosis, is the semiotic dimen-
sion that distinguishes human understanding.14
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7.  Summary
7.1  Triadic relations
Semiosis is the consequence of the provenance, whether in nature or in 
culture, of irreducibly triadic relations. In these relations the third element, 
what Peirce called “the interpretant”, is at a different level than the repre-
sentamen and its significate. The introduction of this new level is a basic, 
perhaps the basic,15 version of “thirdness”. In the world of nature prior to 
life you have semiosis going on, but here it operates simply to move the 
universe in the direction of being able to support life, in the direction where, 
from “nothing but” you get unexpectedly, as it were, “something more” – 
unexpectedly, because the “something more” is not part of the final causa-
lity of inorganic interactants but is rather a chance event, a “side outcome” 
of the interactions.
It was at a conference in Lund, Sweden, that one of the participants – 
and I wish I had asked his name so I could credit him for the insight – pro-
posed that a basic problem of semiotics is how do you get something more 
from nothing but? But once human life has emerged as the “something 
more”, responsibility emerges as well, for the human animal is the only ani-
mal capable of being irresponsible, while being responsible is what ethical 
demands come down to. Ethical behavior is not “doing what you are told”; 
ethical behavior is acting responsibly in whatever circumstances you find 
yourself. And seeing the difference between being responsible and being 
skillful is what metasemiosis – semiotics – alone makes possible, and this 
only in the world of human culture.
7.2   Free will
What does “free will” mean? All animals make choices; choices are unavo-
idable, so what makes them “free” in some cases but not others? What 
makes some choices by human animals “free”, in contrast to generically 
animal choices, is that they be made on the basis of the appetite which fol-
lows upon this aspect or feature of the Innenwelt which does not reduce to 
perception of the sensible. So it comes down to this. Awareness of the envi-
ronment for all animals begins with sensation as resulting from the physi-
cal interaction between the animal body and its surroundings. Perception 
then adds to that the objective level of experience organized in terms of (+)/
(-)/(∅) relative to the animal type. Free will comes in only at that level bey-
ond perception where the human animal perceives “the good” as not whol-
ly reducible to the (+)/(-)/(∅) perceptual organization of objects but as con-
cerning further the world of things as they are in themselves and not only 
in relation to my sensible desires. That is where “responsibility” arises, in 
seeing something as “should be done given these circumstances” regard-
less of “what I would prefer to do considering matters only in relation to 
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myself”. There is not only the generically animal Umwelt as objective world, 
there is further the species-specifically human Umwelt, the Lebenswelt, 
which concerns the being of things as involving my pattern of desires but 
at the same time being able to see intellectually that there is a pattern of 
interactions among things, a patterns of physical interactions, which not 
only preceded but here and now surrounds the pattern of individual animal 
desires and must be taken into account in order to decide what is “good” 
here and now even within the pattern of my desires as animal based on the 
(+)/(-)/(∅) organization within the Lebenswelt’s zoösemiotic dimension.16 In 
short, choice becomes “free” only when it is based on an intellectual reco-
gnition of things as more than objects of animal desire. The good which 
doesn’t reduce to the sensible is the object of choice when the “choice” 
goes beyond the immediate world of animal interests in objects organized 
perceptually as (+)/(-)/(∅). Such choices may turn out to be wrong or based 
on mistaken understanding; but the point is that at the moment they are 
made the “choice” is based primarily on an intellectual understanding of 
“the way things should be” as subordinating the perceptual estimations of 
“the way I want things to be for me”.
The distinction thus between zoösemiosic and specifically anthropose-
miosic choices is by no means a simple contrast, for the two are always 
entangled in human action; but the aspect of being “free” attaches to choices 
made in the light of seeing responsibility, regardless of whether they are 
made under that light (“good”) or in spite of it (“evil”). Goods that go bey-
ond pleasure sometimes require to be sought, to be given priority. Recog-
nition of that begets responsibility as something only human animals – semi-
otic animals – can live up to. Judgment and experience are involved in all 
animal choices; but only when the awareness surrounding the choice made 
has an intellectual dimension can the choice be properly called a “free 
choice”; and that dimension of awareness is not present in zoösemiosis but 
only in anthroposemiosis by reason of the difference it makes for aware-
ness when the concepts involved transcend the dimension of (+)/(-)/(∅). 
Only human animals can make choices in that sense, while choices are 
unavoidable for all animals including humans. It is the dimension of aware-
ness on which the choice is made that alone makes the choice a product 
of so-called “free will”.
Notes
* This essay is a revision of a talk given in 2014 at the 12th World Congress of the 
International Association of Semiotic Studies held at the New Bulgarian Univer-
sity in Sofia, Bulgaria.
1 The development and the origins of the term “semioethics” can be found in Pet-
rilli and Ponzio 2003. In Ponzio 2010 (cf. Deely 2010c: 49–50 note 66; and Petril-
li 2012: 185–186, and further Petrilli 2014: xv–xxii and 267ff.), Ponzio tells me that 
he first used this term as such in September of 1990 “as a displacement of ‘e’ in 
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the Italian word ‘semeiotica’: “a play that indicates in Semiotics the ancient voca-
tion of Semeiotics (of Hippocrates and Galen) for improving or bettering life.” He 
traces the semiotic mainstream search for a “proper name” – (“etosemiotica”, “tele-
osemiotica”, “semiotica etica”?) – under which best to develop the ethical dimen-
sion of semiotic understanding (“in contraposition to ‘semiotica cognitiva’”) from 
the early 1980s to “the landing, or final achievement” of a “long crossing of texts, 
conceptions, and words” in the 2003 Petrilli-Ponzio book. Quite unrelated to this 
development and in a far more restricted sense, the term “semioetica” was used 
by Francesco Aqueci 1998 and in the title of his 2007 book. Vailati corresponded 
with Lady Welby – see Petrilli 2009: 379–384 (commentary), 407–418 (correspon-
dence); and also Petrilli 2015: chp. 6). In this context, Aqueci (1998: 54) speak of 
“L’esigenza di una semiotica, di una scienza generale dei segni, è in incubazione 
e matura tra la fine del XIX e i primi decenni del XX secolo con apporti dal ver-
sante filosofico (Peirce), linguistico (Saussure), filosofico-letterario (Ogden e 
Richards), logico-analitico (Morris). Ora, è degno di nota il fatto che Vailati, già in 
uno scritto del 1908, ‘La grammatica dell‘algebra’, si ponga il problema tipicamen-
te semiotico di studiare tutti i sistemi di segni, senza distinzione tra ‘naturali’ e ‘arti-
ficiali’.” How far Aqueci’s reading of Vailati stands from the post-Sebeok semiotic 
mainstream development is suggested by his failure to give even passing menti-
on of the fact that the notion in Vailati of sign as transcending the nature/culture 
divide echoes the first general notion of sign exactly as Augustine introduced it in 
his i. 397–427 De Doctrina Christiana. Specifically as regards the term in questi-
on, Aqueci (1998: 54) also notes that the idea of any ‘semioethics’ in Vailati’s work 
was in fact quite marginal (“Ora, è vero che questa consapevolezza del carattere 
semioetico del linguaggio nel campo pratico restò sempre marginale nella rifles-
sione di Vailati”), as well as thin (“Lo strumento, però, è sempre quello, il simbo-
lismo logico, messo a disposizione dalla allora nascente logica formale”), and thus 
stands in a minor context quite subordinate within the major context of semiotic 
development channeled by Sebeok since at least 1963 (see Cobley et al. 2011; 
Deely 2010b). Hence it remains that the term “semioetica” to name the practical 
extension of theoretical semiotics – carries a much richer comprehension than 
what Aqueci associates with his own work and that of Vailati. This pertains to the 
idea that was developed by Ponzio and Petrilli from the early 1980s to the term 
itself was independently coined for that development in 1990, then finally as appea-
ring in their seminal volume of 2003. It is the sense of the term as utilized in the 
2003 Petrilli and Ponzio title and summarily defined by Jeff Bernard in 2009, in 
contrast to the earlier unrelated and marginal occurrence Aqueci develops, that 
provides the mainstream influence within the 21st century global development of 
what began with Augustine’s doctrina signorum.
2 “Human understanding recognizes the animal before it recognizes what is human 
within the animal” (“prius occurrit intellectui nostro cognoscere animal quam cog-
noscere hominem”) – Aquinas c.1266: Summa theologiae I, Q. 85 corpus.
3 On provenation, see Deely 2010a: xiii–xiv.
4 The usual way we use the terms “subject” and “object” today is actually the sedi-
mentation down to the level of “common speech” or “everyday language” of the 
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 philosophical views of Descartes and the early modern philosophers. We have to 
get beyond that.
5 Augustine esp. i. 397–426: De Doctrina Christiana. Full analysis in Deely 2009: 
Augustine & Poinsot.
6 In the “standard modern histories” of philosophy, we encounter here, in effect, a 
“black hole” where the gap between the “high middle ages” and “early modern phi-
losophy” is bridged in the main by “Renaissance Humanism”: see Deely 1994a.
7 Peirce c.1905: CP 5.534 makes some remarks illuminative of this question: “our 
faculty of language ... is itself a phenomenon of self-control. For thinking is a kind 
of conduct, and is itself controllable, as everybody knows. Now the intellectual 
control of thinking takes place by thinking about thought. All thinking is by signs; 
and the brutes use signs. But they perhaps rarely think of them as signs. To do so 
is manifestly a second step in the use of language. Brutes use language, and 
seem to exercise some little control over it. But they certainly do not carry this con-
trol to anything like the same grade that we do. They do not criticize their thought 
logically. One extremely important grade of thinking about thought, which my logi-
cal analyses have shown to be one of chief, if not the chief, explanation of the 
power of mathematical reasoning, is a stock topic of ridicule among the wits. This 
operation is performed when something, that one has thought about any subject, 
is itself made a subject of thought.”
8 Peirce 1904: CP 8.332: “Thirdness is the triadic relation ... considered as consti-
tuting the mode of being of a sign.” Cf. Deely 2002: “A Body Is Never Enough To 
Complete Semiosis”.
9 Tønnessen points out that one could in principle live off such things as milk and 
cheese, honey and eggs, without killing being involved; adding: “Relatedly, James 
Lovelock has suggested (somewhat foolishly) that we should all have diets based 
on minerals (no animals, no plants).” (cf. Tønnessen 2014b) Harvesting apples 
does not kill the apple tree, but eating the apple sure does the apple!
10 Who, though he knew nothing of Poinsot’s own work did draw considerably upon 
the Latin semiotic development, not only upon Duns Scotus (c.1266–1308) but 
also upon Poinsot’s principal university teachers, the Conimbricenses (1606/7, cf. 
Doyle 2001 with Deely 2001 “Foreword”. See further Beuchot and Deely 1995: 
“Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot”; Deely 
1994b. Doyle 1984, and Doyle 1998.
11 I exapt the term from Husserl 1936 to signify the generic Umwelt as species-spe-
cifically human, providing the answer to Heidegger’s question (1927: 437) as to 
“Why”, for the human animal, “does Being get ‘conceived’ ‘proximally’ in terms of 
the present-at-hand and not in terms of the ready-to-hand, which indeed lies closer 
to us?” – since indeed, as Aquinas c.1266: I, Q. 85c) put it: “prius occurrit intellec-
tui nostro cognoscere animal quam cognoscere hominem” (“human understan-
ding recognizes the animal before it recognizes what is human within the animal”).
12 Peirce’s c.1905 remark cited in note 8, above, very much echoes Maritain’s view.
13 Hence the title of the “Sequel” to Deely 2010b: “The ethical entailment of semiotic 
animal, or the need to develop a semioethics”.
14 See the Index entry “metasemiosis” in Deely 2009: 292, and the further develop-
ment in Deely 2014: Sections 8.3 and 9. The conclusions in this matter, including 
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the realization that “metasemiotics” would be an oxymoron, were reached through 
discussions with Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio.
15 In fact, it was only in writing my essay on “Aristotle’s Triangle and the Triadic Sign” 
(Deely 2008a) that I finally got the point of what Floyd Merrell had asserted to me 
in 1993 at the 18th Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of America, namely, 
that the triadic relation cannot with full accuracy be represented by a triangle as 
a consequence of the fact that a triangle in principle is reducible to an intersec-
tion of dyadic relations, while the triadic sign is not thus reducible. Now that I have 
gotten the point fully, I am also at a loss to draw a truly accurate diagram of the 
triadic relation in any two-dimensional form!
16 Editors’ note: Deely distinguished between ”zoösemiotic” (relating to the semi-
osis of animals) and ”zoosemiotic” (relating to the semiosis of zoological gar-
dens).
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